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CORPORATIONS-CHARTER-CHANGE OF VOTING RIGHT BY A.MENDMENT-
Defendant, incorporated in 1938 with an authorized capital stock of 500 
shares, amended its articles of incorporation in 1940 to increase the com-
mon stock to 2,000 shares, and to authorize the issue of preferred stock. 
By the amendment, the voting power was vested exclusively in the com-
mon stock, with the exception that the holders of preferred stock would 
acquire temporary voting power upon default of four semi-annual 
dividends. Default in payment of dividends occurred and the preferred 
stock.holders exercised the right to vote from 1943 on. In 1953, a second 
amendment was proposed and passed by a majority in interest vote of the 
common stock.holders and a unanimous vote of the preferred stock.holders. 
By this second amendment voting power was given equally, share for share, 
to the holders of both common stock and preferred stock. The plaintiffs, 
holders of common stock, brought suit in equity to have the 1953 amend-
ment declared invalid, contending that it abrogated substantial property 
and contractual rights. The common pleas court held that the exclusive 
right of common stockholders to vote was not a property or contractual 
right. On appeal, held, affirmed. The amendment is one which con-
cerns the internal management of the corporation rather than "vested 
rights." Metzger v. George Washington Memorial Park, 380 Pa. 350, UO 
A. (2d) 423 (1955). 
It has long been held that the grant of a charter by a state to a private 
corporation constitutes a contract between the state and the corporation.1-
It has been said also that the charter involves a contract both between the 
corporation and the shareholders, and between the shareholders inter se.2 
This doctrine had the effect of giving corporations a peculiar immunity 
from the regulatory power of the state by virtue of the constitutional 
prohibition against impairment of contractual obligations.3 To overcome 
this handicap, almost all states enacted legislation or adopted constitutional 
1 Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 518 (1819). 
2 Morris v. American Public Utilities Co., 14 Del, Cb, 1!16, 122 A. 696 (1923); 2 C001t, 
CORPORATIONS, 8th ed., §492 (192!1), 
3 U.S. CONST., art. I, §10, cl. 1. 
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provmons reserving to the state the power to alter, amend or repeal 
charters granted to private corporations.4 Most courts assume that the 
reserved power not only authorizes the legislature to impose amend-
ments but also authorizes the legislature to repose the power to amend the 
charter in a majority in interest of the shareholders.5 In the principal 
case the applicable statutes authorized the change of preferences or other 
special rights by an amendment adopted by a majority in interest vote of 
the shareholders.6 However, certain obligations arising out of the contract 
have been held to be of such a fundamental nature as to be immune from 
change except by consent of all the shareholders.7 Some cases have in-
cluded voting rights within this immunity.8 There is, however, authority 
sustaining the contrary position of the principal case, based on the reason-
ing that the right to vote shares is not a property or contractual right.9 A 
better approach would be to disregard the so-called "vested rights" doc-
trine altogether, inasmuch as the charter itself incorporates the reserved 
power and, therefore, the stockholders may be said to have assented to 
possible changes in the contract. On these grounds, the "vested rights" 
doctrine has been repudiated, at least in part, in two important corpora-
tion states.10 However, some standard is necessary to protect minority 
stockholders from arbitrary and prejudicial amendments by the majority. 
1-Vith regard to financial interests, a fairness test has been utilized for the 
4 See 7 FLETCHER, CYc. CoRP., perm. ed., §§3668 to 3671 (1931); PA. CoNsr., art. 16, §IO. 
5 See BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS, rev. ed., §274, p. 645 (1946); I THOMPSON, CORPORA-
TIONS, 3d ed., §434 (1927). 
6 "A business corporation, in the manner hereinafter provided in this article, may 
from time to time amend its articles: . • • (4) To increase or diminish its authorized 
capital stock, or to reclassify the same by changing the number, par value, designations, 
preferences, or relative, participating, optional or other special rights of the shares, or the 
qualifications, limitations, or restrictions of such rights, ... [and] (5) in any and as 
many other respects as desired: Provided, That the articles as so amended would be au-
thorized by this act as original articles of incorporation." Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1938) 
tit. 15, §2852-801 as amended. 
" ..• Unless the articles require a greater vote, the proposed amendment shall be 
adopted upon receiving the affirmative vote of the holders of at least a majority of the 
outstanding shares entitled to vote thereon .... " Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1938) tit. 15, 
§2852-805. 
7 See BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS, rev. ed., §277, p. 649 (1946). 
s Lord v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 194 N.Y. 212, 87 N.E. 443 (1909). In 
Loewenthal v. Rubber Reclaiming Co., 52 N.J. Eq. 440, 28 A. 454 (1894), it was held that 
an attempt by the majority to abrogate the right to vote cumulatively was invalid. This 
result was necessary under the New Jersey rule that, under the reserved power, there 
may be no delegation to the majority of the right to amend. But as an alternative ground, 
the court rested its decision on the "vested rights" doctrine. 
9 Morris v. American Public Utilities Co., note 2 supra; Topkis v. Delaware Hardware 
Co., 23 Del. Ch. 125, 2 A. (2d) 114 (1938). 
10 At one time both New York and Delaware considered the right to accrued divi-
dends a "vested right." Keller v. Wilson & Co., 21 Del. Ch. 391, 190 A. 115 (1936); Roberts 
v. Roberts-Wicks Co., 184 N.Y. 257, 77 N.E. 13 (1906). Later decisions have disregarded 
the "vested rights" approach and have held that the question was to be determined solely 
by the terms of the statute authorizing amendments to the charter. Federal United Corp. 
v. Havender, 24 Del. Ch. 318, 11 A. (2d) 331 (1940); Davison v. Parke, Austin & Lipscomb, 
Inc., 285 N.Y. 500, 35 N.E. (2d) 618 (1941). 
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protection of the rights of the minority,11 and there is no apparent reason 
why this same test would not apply equally well to limit unreasonable 
impairment of voting rights. The difficulty with such a test is that in most 
cases it involves complicated questions of fact which must be determined 
in the light of the circumstances of the particular case,12 thus prolonging 
litigation. But the "fairness" test, as opposed to a "vested rights" doctrine, 
has the advantages of allowing a corporation to adapt itself to changing 
economic circumstances. In addition, it limits the power of a small group 
of dissenters to block beneficial corporate action or to use their shares for 
nuisance purposes. These advantages, plus the logical inconsistency in 
the "vested rights" doctrine, would seem to warrant a shift to a new 
approach. 
Dale W. Van Winkle, S.Ed. 
11 Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., (3d Cir. 1947) 162 F. (2d) 36. See Meck, "Accrued 
Dividends on Cumulative Preferred Stocks: the Legal Doctrine," 55 HARV. L. R.Ev. 71 
(1941); Latty, "Fairness-the Focal Point in Preferred Stock Arrearage Elimination," 29 
VA. L. R.Ev. 1 (1942). 
12 Clarke v. Gold Dust Corp., (3d Cir. 1939) 106 F. (2d) 598. 
